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1 Introduction 
 
This contribution concerns the judgment of the Cape High Court in Opperman v 
Boonzaaier1 as well as its confirmation by the Constitutional Court2 in National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman.3 The high court per Binns-Ward J declared section 89(5)(c) 
of the National Credit Act4 unconstitutional because the section permitted an 
arbitrary deprivation of property in contravention of the constitutional property 
clause.5 This finding was confirmed by the majority of the CC per Van der 
Westhuizen J.6 
 
The NCA requires that a person must apply to the National Credit Regulator7 to be 
registered as a credit provider if "that person, alone or in conjunction with any 
associated person, is the credit provider under at least 100 credit agreements other 
than incidental credit agreements".8 Registration is also required if "the total 
principal debt owed to that credit provider under all outstanding credit agreements 
                                                 
*  Reghard Brits. BComm LLB LLD (Stellenbosch). Postdoctoral Fellow at the South African 
Research Chair in Property Law, Stellenbosch University. Email: reghard@sun.ac.za. For reading 
and commenting on this contribution, thank you to Prof AJ van der Walt and Dr Zsa-Zsa 
Boggenpoel. 
1  Opperman v Boonzaaier (24887/2010) 2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) (hereafter "Opperman 
(CHC)"). For a discussion, see Van der Walt 2012 JQR para 2.1.1. 
2  Hereafter "the CC". 
3  National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter "Opperman (CC)"). 
4  National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter "the NCA"). 
5  Section 25, particularly subs (1), of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter "the Constitution"). 
6  Mogoeng CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Khampepe J, Nkabinde J and Skweyiya J concurred. Cameron J 
wrote a dissenting minority judgment with which Froneman J and Jafta J agreed. 
7  Hereafter "the NCR". 
8  Section 40(1)(a) NCA. On the registration requirement in general, see Van Zyl "Registration". 
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other than incidental credit agreements exceeds the threshold prescribed" by the 
minister.9 The current threshold is R500 000.10 
 
The applicant in Opperman11 lent R7 million (above the threshold) to a friend, the 
first respondent. On the first respondent's inability to repay the loan, the applicant 
applied to have him sequestrated. On the return date Binns-Ward J refused to make 
a final sequestration order due to concerns emanating from the NCA's application to 
this dispute. After various postponements and an amendment to the notice of 
motion to include a constitutional challenge against the applicable provision, the 
matter again came before Binns-Ward J.12 This time the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the NCR – the second to fourth respondents – 
were joined.13 
 
The problem was that the applicant was not registered as a credit provider, which 
technically meant that he was not allowed to "make available or extend credit, enter 
into a credit agreement or agree to do any of those things".14 The effect of this 
prohibition was that the credit agreements were "unlawful ... and void to the extent 
provided for in section 89",15 which section emphasises that "a credit agreement is 
unlawful if at the time the agreement was made, the credit provider was 
unregistered" despite the fact that the NCA requires registration in this instance.16 
 
In other words, because the credit agreement was unlawful, the court had to declare 
it "void as from the date the agreement was entered into".17 Accordingly, in terms of 
section 89(5)(c), the court was bound to order that  
 
                                                 
9  Sectionss 40(1)(b) and 42(1) NCA. 
10  Draft National Credit Amendment Bill, 2013 (GN 713 in GG 28893 of 1 June 2006). 
11  For the facts, see Opperman (CHC) paras 1-3 and Opperman (CC) paras 4-6. 
12  Opperman (CHC) para 1. 
13  Opperman (CHC) para 2. 
14  Section 40(3) NCA. 
15  Section 40(4) NCA. 
16  Section 89(2)(d) NCA. 
17  Section 89(5)(a) NCA. See Opperman (CHC) para 5. The agreement would have been saved 
from invalidity if the applicant, "at the time the credit agreement was made, or within 30 days 
after that time ... had applied for registration ... and was awaiting a determination of that 
application" (s 89(4)(a) NCA), which was not the case. 
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all the purported rights of the credit provider under that credit agreement to 
recover any money paid or goods delivered to, or on behalf of, the consumer in 
terms of that agreement are either - 
(i) cancelled, unless the court concludes that doing so in the circumstances 
would unjustly enrich the consumer; or 
(ii) forfeit to the State, if the court concludes that cancelling those rights in the 
circumstances would unjustly enrich the consumer.18 
 
The court regarded the applicant's right to claim restitution of performance rendered 
in terms of a void contract (a personal right based on unjustified enrichment) as 
"property" for constitutional purposes. Therefore, based on this assumption the 
judge declared section 89(5)(c) unconstitutional because the forfeiture to the state 
of the applicant's "purported rights" would effect an arbitrary deprivation of property 
(that is, his enrichment claim) in contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The NCR appealed to the CC in an effort to prevent the confirmation of constitutional 
invalidity, which appeal was opposed by the applicant. 
 
The purpose of this discussion is to analyse the courts' application of the section 
25(1) non-arbitrariness test. It is suggested that this decision is a valuable 
contribution not only to NCA jurisprudence but also to the development of 
constitutional property law in South Africa. Binns-Ward J (whose decision was 
approved by the CC)19 meticulously scrutinised the effects of section 89(5)(c) of the 
NCA, which effects were clearly overbroad. One of the most important contributions 
of these decisions (especially the CC judgment) is the authority for the proposition 
that personal rights (or remedies) sounding in money (that is, debts) qualify as 
"property" for section 25 purposes. Although the facts specifically dealt with a 
restitution claim (in enrichment), the same principle will likely apply to all personal 
rights or claims sounding in money. 
 
                                                 
18  For general literature on the consequences of unlawful credit agreements, see Kelly-Louw 
Consumer Credit Regulation 196-200; Van Zyl "Registration" 5-25–5-27; Otto "Conclusion" 9-7–
9-9 and 9-12–9-13; Otto and Otto National Credit Act 52-53; Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" para 
82. 
19  Opperman (CC) para 88. 
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Moreover, the case illustrates the value of employing constitutional property law to 
interpret and evaluate the NCA to ensure that its debt relief mechanisms do not 
have an unjustified impact on creditors but result in a proper balance between the 
rights of credit providers and consumers. As noble and legitimate as the Act's 
purposes are, it is accordingly necessary to evaluate the relationship between these 
purposes and the effects of the Act's mechanisms on individual credit providers. 
 
According to the CC, the questions that needed to be answered were as follows:20  
 
(1) what is the correct interpretation of section 89(5)(c);  
(2) does section 89(5)(c) deal with property for the purposes of section 25(1);  
(3) does the provision amount to arbitrary deprivation of property;  
(4) does it contain a constitutionally permissible limitation of the right protected 
in section 25(1); and  
(5) what is the appropriate remedy? 
 
The structure of the discussion that follows will roughly correspond to these 
questions. In the course of the analysis I also refer to another case that did not 
provide conclusive answers, namely the Free State High Court's decision in 
Cherangani Trade and Investment 107 (Edms) Bpk v Mason21 and its appeal to the 
CC in Cherangani Trade & Invest 107 (Pty) Ltd v Mason.22 This contribution is longer 
and more detailed than would traditionally be the case with case discussions, the 
reason being that it is necessary to set out exactly how each court dealt with the 
various ways in which the NCA allegedly could be interpreted on this point. It is also 
necessary to provide a detailed explanation of how especially the Cape High Court 
conducted the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness test, since it is an impressive example 
of how this kind of analysis ought to be done. 
 
                                                 
20  Opperman (CC) para 3. 
21  Cherangani Trade and Investment 107 (Edms) Bpk v Mason (6712/2008) 2009 ZAFSHC 30 (12 
March 2009) (hereafter "Cherangani (FSHC)"). For a discussion, see Otto 2010 TSAR. 
22  Cherangani Trade & Invest 107 (Pty) Ltd v Mason 2011 11 BCLR 1123 (CC) (hereafter 
"Cherangani (CC)"). 
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2 Interpretation and effect of section 89(5)(c) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the common law principles surrounding the consequences of unlawful 
agreements are discussed by various authors, a detailed treatise would be 
superfluous.23 Not only does the NCA state that an unlawful agreement must be 
declared void, but the common law has the same effect. Under the common law, no 
obligations arise from a void contract and hence no action can be founded on it. Had 
the NCA not included section 89(5)(c), the common law would have regulated the 
consequences of the invalid agreement. 
 
Under the common law, a party who has performed under a void agreement is 
entitled to restoration under an unjustified enrichment claim.24 However, this right to 
claim restitution is restricted by the par delictum rule, which – as a point of 
departure – places an absolute bar on the recovery of performances rendered by a 
party who was guilty of disgraceful conduct. The rule can nonetheless be relaxed if it 
would be in accordance with public policy and if it is necessary to effect simple 
justice between the parties.25  
 
However, although it also ensures non-enforcement of performance under a void 
agreement, section 89(5)(c) of the NCA prevents courts from deviating from the 
strict par delictum rule.26 The creditor can never reclaim performances rendered and 
any resultant unjustified enrichment for the debtor must be declared forfeit to the 
state. The intended outcome seems to be to punish the creditor but without unduly 
benefitting the debtor, with the state enjoying the benefit instead. Indeed, the NCA 
goes further than the common law, since the operation of section 89(5)(c) does not 
                                                 
23  For instance, see Van der Merwe et al Contract 173-182; Van Rensburg, Lotz and Van Rhijn 
"Contract" para 413; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 89-90. See also Otto 
2009 TSAR 424-427. 
24  Van Rensburg, Lotz and Van Rhijn "Contract" para 413 fn 8. 
25  Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 544 and 550 and other sources listed in Van Rensburg, Lotz and 
Van Rhijn "Contract" para 413 fn 11. See also the CC's summary of the common law principles in 
Opperman (CC) paras 12ff. 
26  Otto 2009 TSAR 431. 
 R BRITS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
427 / 487 
require turpitude or disgraceful conduct. All that is required is that the agreement be 
unlawful in terms of the NCA. The current example (where the credit provider was 
not registering as required) will be affected by the provision despite the fact that 
there might have been no bad faith or turpitude involved. However, the exact 
interpretation of section 89(5)(c) proved to be controversial. 
 
2.2 The Cherangani decisions 
 
After the applicant in the Cherangani matter had instituted action to enforce loans 
granted, the respondent raised certain defences, including one based on the NCA.27 
The argument was that the credit transaction was unlawful and therefore void 
because the applicant was not registered as a credit provider.28 As in Opperman, the 
lender in Cherangani was not in the business of providing credit, although it 
occasionally assisted persons with financing.29 It actually seemed as though the 
applicant was involved in lending practices more often than he claimed and the court 
accepted the NCR's desire to take note of him.30 Consequently, the court held that 
the credit agreements were unlawful and void, and that the applicant was – in terms 
of section 89(5)(c) – not entitled to claim restitution of the monies delivered to the 
respondent. 
 
After unsuccessful recourse to the Supreme Court of Appeal,31 the judgment in 
Cherangani was taken on appeal to the CC, where the constitutionality of the 
forfeiture provision was first raised. The applicant argued that the high court was 
wrong in finding that section 89(5)(c) obliged it to make the relevant order. Instead, 
he claimed that the court should have found that it had a discretion in this regard 
and that this discretion should not have been exercised.32 
 
                                                 
27  Cherangani (FSHC) paras 27ff. 
28  Cherangani (FSHC) para 30. 
29  Cherangani (FSHC) para 34. 
30  Cherangani (FSHC) para 34. 
31  Hereafter "the SCA". 
32  Cherangani (CC) para 3. 
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In the course of asking whether the case raised a constitutional matter, the CC per 
Yacoob J referred to the applicant's argument that section 89(5)(c) of the NCA 
should be read in conformity with section 25(1) of the Constitution (in the light of 
the obligation in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution). The result of this 
interpretation exercise would allegedly have been to grant the court a discretion as 
to whether or not the forfeiture order should be granted.33 The applicant contended 
that the absence of such a discretion would render the forfeiture disproportionate 
and therefore it would amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property.34 On the other 
hand, an appropriate discretion arguably would have avoided the unconstitutional 
result. 
 
The applicant further asserted that the appeal to the CC was urgent because it 
would be in the interest of the general public as well as the credit market to ensure 
that forfeitures that amount to arbitrary deprivations of property are prevented.35 
Yet the CC refused to grant leave to appeal, since it would have had to act as a 
court of first and last instance. These matters were not raised in the high court, and 
the SCA did not provide reasons for its refusal to grant leave to appeal either.36 
Moreover, the issues that the case raised were complex ones in which "fairness and 
justice in the credit market in the context of rights in our Constitution" were 
implicated.37 
 
The CC moreover referred to the difficulty of giving meaning to section 89(5)(c),38 
and pointed out that39 
 
[i]t is difficult to fathom exactly what is taken away from the applicant and exactly 
what is forfeit to the state. Are they "purported rights" which do not exist anymore 
or is the right to sue for unjust enrichment also forfeited? 
 
                                                 
33  Cherangani (CC) para 8. 
34  Cherangani (CC) para 8. 
35  Cherangani (CC) para 9. 
36  Cherangani (CC) para 12. 
37  Cherangani (CC) para 12. 
38  Cherangani (CC) para 13. 
39  Cherangani (CC) para 14. 
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These uncertainties emphasised why the issue could not be decided without the 
effective and meaningful participation by the Minister of Finance.40 The state might, 
for example, want to explain the context and background of the provision and 
provide reasons why possible disproportionality may be justified: 41 
 
The state has a legitimate interest in curbing the scourge of irresponsible borrowing 
and lending, and it may be that a measure of disproportionality is the appropriate 
cost for the achievement of this laudable objective. 
 
The CC consequently dismissed the application for leave to appeal, since there were 
too many uncertainties about the operation and effect of section 89(5)(c). 
Furthermore, the state had to be joined because – as beneficiary of the forfeiture 
provision that was being attacked – it had a substantial interest in the outcome of 
the case. 
 
2.3 Otto's criticism42 
 
Based on the high court's decision in Cherangani, Otto criticises the effect of section 
89(5)(c).43 He also commented on the provision in an earlier publication, specifically 
with reference to the common law par delictum rule.44 The author's criticism of the 
provision can be summarised by the way he describes it as a "verregaande reëling" 
(preposterous measure),45 and he presents the Cherangani case as proof of this 
criticism.46 Forfeiture to the state of applicant's claims is, according to Otto, 
"skokkend" (shocking).47 However, he acknowledges that the fault does not lie with 
                                                 
40  Cherangani (CC) para 15. 
41  Cherangani (CC) para 15. However, from the CC's subsequent analysis in Opperman (discussed 
in 3.3.3 below), it is clear that the Court eventually did not find that the Act's "laudable" 
objectives justified this "measure" of dispropotionality, at least not under these kinds of 
circumstances. 
42  Otto 2009 TSAR; Otto 2010 TSAR. See also Otto and Otto National Credit Act 52-53; Otto 
"Conclusion" 9-12–9-13; Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
43  Otto 2010 TSAR. 
44  Otto 2009 TSAR. 
45  Otto 2009 TSAR 431; Otto 2010 TSAR 162. 
46  Otto 2010 TSAR 162. 
47  Otto 2010 TSAR 167. 
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the judge but with the relevant provisions of the NCA, which, according to him, are 
inappropriate and unacceptable.48 He also regards section 89(5) as draconian.49 
 
Otto argues that if one considers the nature of the prohibited contracts, it is 
unjustifiable for the Act to prescribe such drastic consequences since none of these 
types of agreements are offensive or concluded per se in bad faith.50 A more just 
and equitable result would have been to impose criminal sanctions on parties who 
contravene the Act's prohibition against certain agreements.51 Of course, invalidity 
can still be the result but Otto contends that it ought to be left to the courts to 
decide whether performance should be returned or if the par delictum rule should be 
strictly adhered to.52 This investigation can then be premised on a value judgment 
made with reference to all the circumstances and the degree of turpitude.53 
 
Otto has subsequently expressed his agreement with the finding that section 
89(5)(c) has unconstitutional results.54 For instance, he refers to the Cape High 
Court's judgment in Opperman as "thorough and well-reasoned"55 – a remark with 
which I agree. 
 
2.4 Opperman (CHC) 
 
For the Cape High Court in Opperman, it was clear that the effect of sections 
89(2)(d) and 89(5)(a), read with 40(4), was that the loan agreements were unlawful 
and therefore should be treated as void.56 However, the applicant argued that the 
words "must order" in section 89(5) should be read as "may order", leaving the 
court with a discretion in this regard.57 The court did not agree with this contention 
and therefore concurred with the third and fourth respondents that the NCA left no 
                                                 
48  Otto 2010 TSAR 167. 
49  Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
50  Otto 2010 TSAR 167. 
51  Otto 2010 TSAR 167; Otto 2009 TSAR 432. 
52  Otto 2010 TSAR 167. 
53  Otto 2010 TSAR 167; Otto 2009 TSAR 431. 
54  Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
55  Otto "Conclusion" 9-13 fn 57; Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
56  Opperman (CHC) para 5. 
57  Opperman (CHC) para 6. This is the same argument raised in the Cherangani cases. 
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scope for doubt that unlawful agreements must be treated as void. Nothing in the 
section indicated an intention that the court would have a discretion to treat "as 
valid a credit agreement that is expressly stigmatised as void".58 
 
Nonetheless, the applicant submitted that section 89(5) should be read in conformity 
with the Constitution.59 The applicant argued that, if the court did not have a 
discretion whether or not to make a cancellation or forfeiture order, the result would 
be an arbitrary deprivation of property, as well as an infringement of his section 34 
rights (access to court).60 However, the court found that this method of statutory 
interpretation was inappropriate in these circumstances, since it would have done 
violence to the language used by the legislature.61 
 
The next question was whether the applicant could recover the money on the 
grounds of unjust enrichment, namely with the condictio ob turpem vel inuistam 
causam.62 The court held that, if the effect of section 89(5)(c) was that an 
enrichment claim should be ordered forfeit to the state, the applicant would have no 
claim against the first respondent.63 
 
It was important to establish what would either be taken away from the applicant 
("cancelled") or – if the consumer would be unjustly enriched by this cancellation – 
declared forfeit to the state.64 These are the two options that section 89(5)(c) 
prescribes without any discretion. Therefore, the key to the provision lay in the 
meaning of "purported rights", since this is what ostensibly would be cancelled or 
forfeited.65 Within the context of section 89, the literal meaning of "purported rights" 
implies that nothing of substance is cancelled or forfeited, since no rights are 
                                                 
58  Opperman (CHC) para 6, relying on Absa Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Luttig 1997 4 SA 229 
(SCA) 238F-241B. 
59  Opperman (CHC) para 6, the applicant relying on Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v 
Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 23 (hereafter "Investigating Directorate v Hyundai"). 
60  Opperman (CHC) para 9. 
61  Opperman (CHC) para 6, relying on Investigating Directorate v Hyundai paras 21-26. 
62  Opperman (CHC) para 7. 
63  Opperman (CHC) para 8. 
64  Opperman (CHC) para 10. 
65  Opperman (CHC) para 11. 
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created by a void contract. Yet cancellation or forfeiture of something that does not 
exist could not have been the legislature's intention. Therefore, the provision is 
"confused and confusing" because the drafters did not consider the principles of 
contract law.66 
 
The court held that "purported rights" could be nothing other than the right to claim 
restitution of performance rendered in terms of a void agreement, since the 
cancellation of no other right would lead to unjust enrichment in this context.67 In 
fact, for the creditor to recover monies paid or goods delivered in terms of a 
transaction that is void, he would have to claim restitution thereof.68 However, the 
court noted that if the "purported rights" are the creditor's right to restitution, there 
would probably never be a situation where the cancellation of such a right would not 
unjustly enrich the consumer.69 Hence, the court could not conceive of an example 
where a court could make an order to cancel the "purported rights" (right to 
restitution) under section 89(5)(c)(i) (the first option), since there would always be 
unjust enrichment of the consumer, which would compel the court to rather order 
the rights forfeit to the state under section 89(5)(c)(ii) (the second option).70 
 
The first respondent would obviously be unjustly enriched if the applicant was 
denied the right to recover the money advanced and received by the first 
respondent.71 In terms of the common law, "absent turpitude on the part of the 
[applicant], the par delictum defence is simply not available. Where payment, even 
though illegal, was not dishonourable, the [applicant] must succeed" with its claim to 
restitution.72 It was ironic that, if the creditor had acted in turpitude, the par 
delictum defence would have excluded him from claiming restitution and therefore 
                                                 
66  Opperman (CHC) para 11. 
67  Opperman (CHC) para 13. 
68  Opperman (CHC) para 13. 
69  Opperman (CHC) para 13. 
70  Opperman (CHC) para 13. 
71  Opperman (CHC) para 14, with reference to the common law right of restitution; Jajbhay v 
Cassim 1939 AD 537. 
72  Opperman (HC) para 14, quoting from Afrisure CC v Watson 2009 2 SA 127 (SCA) para 40, with 
reference to Sonnekus Verryking 134 and Lotz "Enrichment" para 215. 
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section 89(5)(c) would not have been applicable.73 However, in this case there was 
no indication of any turpitude.74 
 
The court asked if the effect of section 89(5)(c) was that the court had to order the 
applicant's claim for restitution forfeit to the state.75 The third and fourth 
respondents argued that this was not the case and that the court was vested with a 
discretion. The court rejected this proposal and held that section 89(5)(c) requires 
the court to do either one of two things.76 The court must order that the "purported 
rights" are either cancelled or forfeited to the state. Further, in order to decide 
between these two options, one had to determine whether the consumer would be 
unjustly enriched.77 
 
If the first respondent was not required to make restitution and was therefore 
enriched (as was the case in Opperman), the claim for restitution had to be ordered 
forfeit to the state.78 The court did not have the option to choose neither of these 
options.79 The court pointed to the anomaly represented by the fact that, in contrast 
to section 89(5), section 90 – which deals with unlawful provisions – does provide 
courts with a discretion based on what would be "just and reasonable".80 The court 
could not think of a reason for the difference in approach between these two 
sections,81 which seemed to contribute to the irrationality of section 89(5)(c). 
                                                 
73  Opperman (CHC) para 14. 
74  Opperman (CHC) para 15 
75  Opperman (CHC) para 15. 
76  Opperman (CHC) para 16. 
77  Opperman (CHC) para 16. 
78  Opperman (CHC) para 16. 
79  Opperman (CHC) para 16. 
80  Opperman (CHC) para 17. 
81  Opperman (CHC) para 17. 
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2.5 Opperman (CC) 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
The Opperman case illustrates that the interpretation of section 89(5)(c) is all but 
clear. The NCR argued that the section could be interpreted in a way that does not 
allow for arbitrary deprivation, whereas the applicant contended in favour of the 
high court's interpretation, namely that the proper construct of the section indeed 
resulted in arbitrary deprivation. The minister, on the other hand, acknowledged that 
the section effected a deprivation of property but that it was not arbitrary because 
there were sufficient reasons for it. The minister also argued in the alternative that 
the section could be read to include a discretion, which would render it in line with 
section 25(1). As another alternative, the minister contented that, if the section was 
unconstitutional, the declaration of invalidity ought to be suspended and that an 
interim reading-in should apply.82 
 
Due to the phrase "despite any provision of common law" in section 89(c), the 
common law action for restitution is excluded by this section. Therefore, the 
question was not if and to what extent the provision amended the common law but 
if such a deviation was inconsistent with section 25 of the Constitution.83 The Court 
commented that, if the common law had applied to the situation,84 
 
an unregistered credit provider who was unaware of the requirement to register 
appears to be a good example of an unlawful agreement where there is little or no 
turpitude on the part of the credit provider. 
 
Similar to the common law position, section 89(5)(a) states that the agreement must 
be declared void from its inception.85 However, where the NCA deviates from the 
common law is that section 89(5)(c) appeared to leave little or no room for a judicial 
                                                 
82  Opperman (CC) para 11. 
83  Opperman (CC) para 13. 
84  Opperman (CC) para 18. 
85  Opperman (CC) para 18. 
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discretion.86 The creditor's right to recover money paid or goods delivered must 
either be cancelled or, if the debtor would be unjustly enriched, forfeited to the 
state, irrespective of turpitude, fairness or public policy. If this interpretation was 
correct, the section would take away a creditor's right to restitution.87 
 
Section 89(5)'s goal is to protect debtors by "attaching significant negative 
consequences to the failure to register by credit providers who are required to do 
so".88 The section becomes complicated when dealing with money that the creditor 
paid to the debtor under the void credit agreement.89 Section 89(5)(c) states that 
such money remains with the debtor because all of the creditor's "purported rights" 
to recover money are "cancelled", unless cancellation would "unjustly enrich" the 
consumer.90 The matter becomes even trickier when the debtor would indeed be 
unjustly enriched. 
 
Therefore, the crux of the CC's decision was how section 89(5)(c) should be 
interpreted to deal with the situation where the debtor is enriched by the fact that 
the creditor has no right of restitution. Regarding terminology, the court held that 
the term "unjustly enriched" does not mean anything other than unjustified 
enrichment in common law.91 In what follows I discuss the different possible 
interpretations that the CC considered, which is also where the point of contention 
between the majority and minority judgments originated. 
 
2.5.2 Majority’s judgment 
 
The first possible interpretation is the one supported by Binns-Ward J in the Cape 
High Court. In this view the provision requires that the creditor's right to recover any 
money paid92 
                                                 
86  Opperman (CC) para 18. 
87  Opperman (CC) para 18. The CC also referred to the comment by Otto 2009 TSAR 431 and 434 
that the provision is far reaching, outrageous and unfair. 
88  Opperman (CC) para 21. 
89  Opperman (CC) para 22. 
90  Opperman (CC) para 22. 
91  Opperman (CC) para 24. 
92  Opperman (CC) para 26 (original emphasis.) 
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must be either (i) cancelled, unless the court concludes that doing so would 
unjustly enrich the consumer, or (ii) forfeited to the state, if the court concludes 
that cancelling those rights in the circumstances would unjustly enrich the 
consumer. 
 
In terms of this construction there is no discretion and therefore there are only these 
two possibilities. The court must determine only if there is unjustified enrichment 
present and then make the appropriate order.93 In terms of both possible orders, the 
creditor will lose his right to restitution – both the possible rights under the 
agreement as well as those based on the unjustified enrichment of the debtor.94 
 
The NCR acknowledged that this interpretation would amount to arbitrary 
deprivation of property,95 but it argued that this construal was not correct.96 Instead, 
the NCR put forward that the section could be interpreted in another, constitutionally 
compliant way.97 Hence, the proposed interpretation entailed98 
 
that the right to restitution, consequent upon the declaration of voidness of the 
contract, must be cancelled unless the court concludes that doing so in the 
circumstances would unjustly enrich the consumer. 
 
Therefore, the court would have a discretion to either cancel the creditor's right to 
restitution or to leave it intact and, if the court does not cancel the right, it does not 
have to declare it forfeit to the state.99 In terms of this interpretation, a forfeiture 
order is possible, but the court may grant it only if cancellation of the right to 
restitution would lead to unjustified enrichment.100 Consequently, the forfeiture 
provision does not automatically come into effect if cancellation would unjustly 
enrich the debtor, but the court has a discretion to leave the rights intact or to 
                                                 
93  Opperman (CC) para 26. 
94  Opperman (CC) para 27. 
95  Opperman (CC) para 27. 
96  Opperman (CC) para 28. 
97  Opperman (CC) para 28, with reference to Investigating Directorate v Hyundai para 23. 
98  Opperman (CC) para 28 (original emphasis). 
99  Opperman (CC) para 28. 
100  Opperman (CC) para 29. 
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declare them forfeit to the state.101 The creditor's level of turpitude or 
blameworthiness can be considered in making this decision.102 
 
According to the NCR a court would have three options: (1) cancel the creditor's 
restitution rights; (2) leave the creditor's rights intact because cancellation would 
unjustly enrich the debtor; or (3) forfeit the creditor's rights to the state because the 
debtor would otherwise be unjustly enriched. However, the CC rejected the NCR's 
argument because an interpretation may be followed only if it can be reasonably 
ascribed to the words of the provision.103 The CC held that the "either ... or" wording 
in the section did not allow for the NCR's proposal.104 Rather, this way of connecting 
the two options meant that they had to be read together and that they presented 
only two alternatives, namely cancellation and forfeiture.105 
 
Another possible way to interpret the provision was initially suggested by counsel for 
the applicant. To save the section from unconstitutionality, it was proposed that the 
words "must order" in section 89(5) should be read as "may order".106 The CC 
agreed with the high court's rejection of this argument and it was accordingly 
abandoned before the CC.107 
 
2.5.3 Minority's alternative interpretation108 
 
Cameron J – writing for the minority – supported an alternative interpretation and 
held that he could not endorse Van der Westhuizen J's approach.109 According to the 
minority, the majority's interpretation ignored the words "rights ... under that credit 
agreement" in section 89(5)(c). Even though Cameron J acknowledged that these 
words rendered the provision inoperative, he found that "it is simpler, and truer to 
                                                 
101  Opperman (CC) para 29. 
102  Opperman (CC) para 29. 
103  Opperman (CC) para 31, with reference to Investigating Directorate v Hyundai para 23. 
104  Opperman (CC) para 31. 
105  Opperman (CC) para 31. 
106  Opperman (CC) para 32. 
107  Opperman (CC) para 32. 
108  Opperman (CC) para 92ff per Cameron J (Froneman J and Jafta J concurring). 
109  Opperman (CC) para 92. 
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our task of interpretation, not to ignore the words, but to take them to mean what 
they say".110 If one interprets the section literally, as Cameron J suggested, the 
provision might be inoperative but at least it would not be unconstitutional.111 
According to him, this approach was better than the one followed by Van der 
Westhuizen J, namely "to struggle to find a meaning, in the face of the words 
ignored, only then to declare the provision invalid".112 
 
If the words "rights ... under that credit agreement" were to be taken literally, the 
provision would be incoherent because it could not deprive lenders of their rights of 
recovery, because such rights were based on unjustified enrichment and hence not 
on "rights ... under that credit agreement".113 Moreover, the provision would be 
ineffectual because, since the agreement was void from its inception, there would 
never be any contractual rights that could be cancelled or forfeited to the state.114 
However, Cameron J held that taking the provision as referring to restitutionary 
rights (as the majority did) was "even more radically misplaced", since it is legally 
and linguistically impossible to have restitutionary rights based on unjustified 
enrichment under that credit agreement.115 After all, "[r]ights of recovery in the case 
of a void contract are derived from the common law of restitution, not from the 
agreement".116 
 
According to Cameron J, ignoring these words – which were pivotal to the provision 
– would go "further than a court should, even if it means acknowledging that the 
legislature, in enacting it, misfired".117 According to the minority, "[i]f words are 
reasonably capable of a meaning that avoids conflict with the Constitution, that 
                                                 
110  Opperman (CC) para 93. 
111  Opperman (CC) para 93. 
112  Opperman (CC) para 93. 
113  Opperman (CC) para 101. 
114  Opperman (CC) para 102. 
115  Opperman (CC) para 103. 
116  Opperman (CC) para 103. 
117  Opperman (CC) para 94. 
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meaning must prevail".118 However, to ignore certain words and then hold that the 
provision is unconstitutional, as the majority had done, was inappropriate.119 
 
2.5.4 Majority's response to minority's alternative interpretation120 
 
Van der Westhuizen J summarised the minority's interpretation as follows:121 
 
This interpretation focuses on the words "rights ... under that credit agreement" in 
section 89(5)(c). It holds that as an enrichment claim is not based on the credit 
agreement, it is not included in the provision that deals with rights "under that 
credit agreement". The claim for restitution on the basis of enrichment that the 
credit provider has under common law, is thus not affected by the section. As the 
credit provider is not denied the right to restitution based on enrichment, there is 
no arbitrary deprivation. The provision is thus not constitutionally offensive. 
 
Even though Van der Westhuizen J acknowledged that this interpretation was 
"attractive", he held that it posed certain problems.122 He found that the words 
"under that credit agreement" were not central to the meaning of the provision:123 
 
Why would courts be told to decide whether the consumer is unjustly enriched or 
not, which is the very difference between section 89(5)(c)(i) and (ii), if the 
intention is simply to cancel the non-existing rights under the void agreement and 
say nothing at all about restitution based on enrichment? 
 
Further, section 89(5)(c)(ii) had to be interpreted within the context of the rest of 
the provision as well as within the context of the NCA's aims. Moreover, there was 
indeed a link between the "purported rights" and "that credit agreement". Even 
though an enrichment claim is not based on contract, it arises because of an 
                                                 
118  Opperman (CC) para 96, with reference to Investigating Directorate v Hyundai. 
119  Opperman (CC) para 105. 
120  Opperman (CC) para 33ff. 
121  Opperman (CC) para 34. 
122  Opperman (CC) para 35. 
123  Opperman (CC) para 38. 
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agreement that is void.124 Regarding the scheme of section 89(5), the court 
explained that the subsection appears125 
 
to state the negative consequences for an unregistered credit provider 
progressively, from voidness in (a), through the refunding of money paid by the 
consumer to the credit provider in (b), to the denial of the right to restitution under 
(c). 
 
There might also be practical problems if the minority's interpretation was left in 
place (with the result that restitution claims were left intact). The creditor would 
have a claim for restitution against the debtor (in terms of (c)) and, at the same 
time, the debtor would have a claim (in terms of (c)) to a refund of all money paid 
by the debtor to the creditor. Van der Westhuizen J held that this approach would 
not make sense.126 He could therefore not support an interpretation of section 
89(5)(c) that rendered it "inoperative and meaningless".127 The court could not find 
that the provision is in line with the Constitution just because of a drafting error 
either.128 
 
2.5.5 Majority's conclusion regarding the correct interpretation 
 
Despite the incoherence with regard to words and phrases in the provision, the CC 
held that the objectives of the NCA as well as section 89(5)(c)'s context could assist 
in interpreting it.129 According to the CC, the phrase "despite any provision of 
common law" indicates the legislature's intention to deny the creditor a remedy that 
he might have had under common law, but which is not in line with the NCA's 
purposes. This remedy could be nothing other than the right to restitution.130 
Furthermore, the term "purported rights" is, in Van der Westhuizen J's view, "clumsy 
                                                 
124  Opperman (CC) para 39. 
125  Opperman (CC) para 39. 
126  Opperman (CC) para 40. 
127  Opperman (CC) para 41. 
128  Opperman (CC) para 41. 
129  Opperman (CC) para 52. 
130  Opperman (CC) para 53. 
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but understandable".131 The term refers to rights that the creditor might have had if 
the agreement was valid, or rights that he mistakenly thinks he still has.132 
 
The court also commented that the rights might in fact always be forfeited to the 
state.133 In response to Cameron J, Van der Westhuizen J stated that his 
interpretation does not ignore the words "under that credit agreement" but merely 
"invokes context and recognises the references to unjust enrichment in that 
provision".134 Therefore, the majority of the CC confirmed that the most plausible 
interpretation of section 89(5)(c) is the one given by Binns-Ward J in the Cape High 
Court. In this regard, Van der Westhuizen J explained that, in terms of common 
sense and in view of the NCA as a whole, the purpose of the provision was as 
follows:135 
 
[C]onsumers have to be protected against uncontrolled credit providers and 
therefore credit providers are required to register; credit providers who do not 
register in contravention of the NCA face severe consequences; courts must declare 
the agreement void and order either that all rights perceived to follow from the 
agreement (including the right to restitution) are cancelled or forfeited to the state. 
 
For the rest of this contribution I accept the majority of the CC's interpretation of 
section 89(5)(c) as the correct one. It is to my mind evident that a forfeiture of the 
unregistered credit provider's right to reclaim performance rendered was indeed 
what the legislature intended, although it failed to express itself logically (which is 
nothing new when it comes to the NCA). Henceforth I focus on the constitutional 
property law enquiry. 
                                                 
131  Opperman (CC) para 54. 
132  Opperman (CC) para 54. 
133  Opperman (CC) para 55, with reference to Cherangani (CC) para 14 and Otto 2009 TSAR 431, 
434. 
134  Opperman (CC) para 56. 
135  Opperman (CC) para 55 (original emphasis). 
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3 The property challenge 
 
3.1 General: Constitutional property law 
 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that136 
 
[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
To conduct a constitutional property challenge, one must follow the methodology set 
out by the CC per Ackermann J in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance,137 which entails a number of steps. Roux lists the 
various questions, of which only the first four are relevant for section 25(1) 
purposes:138 
 
(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the operation 
of [the law in question] amount to property for purposes of s 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state 
concerned]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under s 36 of the Constitution? 
 
If one proves that the interest that is violated amounts to "property" and that there 
is a deprivation of such property, one needs to assess whether the deprivation is 
constitutionally valid and therefore whether it complies with the requirements of 
                                                 
136  For the most comprehensive analyses of s 25 in general, see Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property and Roux "Property". 
137  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (hereafter 
"FNB").  
138  Roux "Property" 46-3, with reference to FNB para 46. The rest of the steps relate to 
expropriation. 
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section 25(1). If the deprivation fails the section 25(1) test, there remains the 
possibility (in theory at least) to save it in terms of the limitation clause.139 
 
To satisfy the requirements of section 25(1), the deprivation in question must be 
effected in terms of law of general application. Secondly, this law may not permit 
the arbitrary deprivation of property. It was clear that the NCA is law of general 
application, but the more pertinent question was if section 89(5)(c) permitted the 
arbitrary deprivation of the applicant's property. Neither the high court nor the CC 
had any difficulty finding that the claim to restitution was "property" for section 
25(1) purposes or that the forfeiture amounted to a deprivation. Instead, the 
decisions focussed mostly on assessing the deprivation against the non-arbitrariness 
standard.140 
 
3.2 Forfeiture of the right to claim restitution: deprivation of property 
 
Although the third and fourth respondents "faintly" argued that forfeiture of the right 
to claim restitution is not a deprivation of property, the Cape High Court held that141 
 
[t]here is ... no doubt that the claim would fall to be counted as an asset in the 
applicant's estate and thus part of his patrimony. The claim not only has a 
monetary value, it is amenable, like any corporeal property owned by the applicant, 
to being disposed of and transferred by him to a third party. 
 
Opperman (CC)142 also addressed the question whether or not the "purported rights" 
of creditors to "recover any money paid or goods delivered" is property for section 
                                                 
139  Section 36(1) of the Constitution. See 3.4 below. 
140  As Roux "Property" 46-2–46-5 predicted (and as the Opperman decisions seem to prove), the 
constitutional property challenge is bound to revolve around the non-arbitrariness test. He refers 
to this result as the arbitrariness vortex. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property 229 and 
236. 
141  Opperman (CHC) para 18. The court cited Roux "Property" 46-16, who in turn relies on Van der 
Walt Property Clause 30-71 (currently in its third addition, published as Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property), and the court also referred to Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1982 1 SA 
490 (ZS) 497-501 (hereafter "Hewlett v Minister"). 
142  Opperman (CC) paras 57-64. 
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25 purposes.143 The CC had not previously specifically held that personal rights 
emanating from contract, delict or enrichment are "property" under section 25.144 
 
Although a personal right is not a real right in property like ownership or usufruct, 
the Court held that section 25 does not deal with ownership but with property.145 
Because the Court had also previously recognised a claim for loss of earning capacity 
or support as "property", it held that "the recognition of the right to restitution of 
money paid, based on unjustified enrichment, as property under section 25(1) is 
logical and realistic".146 This position would also be in line with foreign jurisdictions in 
which personal rights have been recognised as property for constitutional 
purposes.147 
 
Because intangible property has become important in modern-day society, the CC 
held that "property should not be so narrowly interpreted as to diminish the worth of 
the protection given by section 25".148 Van der Westhuizen J relied on the following 
statement in Law Society v Minister: 149 
 
[T]he definition of property for purposes of constitutional protection should not be 
too wide to make legislative regulation impracticable and not too narrow to render 
the protection of property of little worth. 
 
Therefore, the CC concluded that the applicant's enrichment claim qualified as 
property under section 25 of the Constitution.150 The next question was if the 
                                                 
143  Opperman (CC) para 57. 
144  Opperman (CC) para 61. 
145  Opperman (CC) para 61. 
146  Opperman (CC) para 63 (footnote omitted), citing Van der Walt Constitutional Property 115-116 
and 141-142, and referring to the CC's earlier decision in Law Society of South Africa v Minister 
for Transport 2011 1 SA 44 (CC) para 84 (hereafter "Law Society v Minister"). 
147  Opperman (CC) para 63. In this regard the CC mentioned Germany, Australia and Ireland, and 
cited Van der Walt Constitutional Property 150-168 and the Irish case of In the matter of Article 
26 of the Constitution and in the matter of the Health (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 [2005] 
IESC 7. It further referred to the case of Hewlett v Minister, where the Zimbabwean Supreme 
Court found that debts owed by the state are property for purposes of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe, 1979. 
148  Opperman (CC) para 63 (original emphasis). 
149  Law Society v Minister para 83, as quoted by Opperman (CC) para 63. 
150  Opperman (CC) para 64. 
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forfeiture amounted to a deprivation in terms of the property clause.151 In this 
respect the CC confirmed its earlier definition of deprivation in FNB, namely that it 
"depends on the extent of interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation" of 
the right.152 The Court also added the qualification it had made in Offit Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd,153 namely that if the 
interference is "significant enough to have a legally relevant impact" on the affected 
rights, it qualifies as deprivation.154 
 
Since forfeiture involves state conduct through which property is lost to the state 
without the owner's consent and without just compensation,155 the court confirmed 
the well-established principle that forfeiture results in the deprivation of property.156 
In other words, the forfeiture effected by section 89(5)(c) of the NCA also qualifies 
as deprivation of property and as such had to be tested against the requirements of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
Section 89(5)(c) of the NCA provides another example of how the state can interfere 
with property rights so as to achieve a public purpose. On the assumption that 
creditors should not be allowed to benefit from unlawful credit agreements or, more 
specifically, that debtors should not suffer as a result of creditors who operate 
unlawfully, the NCA obliges the courts to declare the creditor's right to claim 
restitution either cancelled or forfeit to the state. The motive behind this measure 
seems to be to discourage creditors from entering into these prohibited agreements. 
When they do so and if the debtor would be unjustly enriched (by the fact that it 
does not have to return the monies or goods received to the creditor), the state 
would acquire the right to claim such restitution from the debtor. This results in a 
                                                 
151  Opperman (CC) para 65. 
152  Opperman (CC) para 66, with reference to FNB paras 57-58 and 60. 
153  Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) paras 
39 and 41. 
154  Opperman (CC) para 66. 
155  The court cited Van der Walt 2000 SAJHR and Van Jaarsveld 2006 Fundamina 138-147. 
156  Opperman (CC) para 67, citing Van der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 2 
SACR 331 (CC) para 1; S v Shaik 2008 2 SA 208 (CC); and Mohunram v National Director of 
Public Prosecution (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) para 9. 
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clear reallocation of patrimony from the creditor to the state and accordingly the 
creditor is deprived of property. 
 
3.3 Arbitrariness 
 
3.3.1 Definition of the test 
 
Once one accepts that the forfeiture of the applicant's right to claim restitution of 
the R7 million is a deprivation of his property, the next step is to determine if it 
satisfies the requirement of section 25(1) that the deprivation may not be 
arbitrary.157 With reference to the CC judgment in FNB, the Cape High Court in 
Opperman repeated the test for non-arbitrariness provided by the CC. It is 
appropriate to quote in full the wording of FNB:158 
 
[I]t is concluded that a deprivation of property is "arbitrary" as meant by s 25 when 
the "law" referred to in s 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the 
particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair. Sufficient reason 
is to be established as follows: 
(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means 
employed, namely the deprivation in question and the ends sought to be 
achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question.  
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered. 
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the 
relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose 
property is affected.  
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of 
the deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent of the 
deprivation in respect of such property.  
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a 
corporeal moveable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established 
in order for the depriving law to constitute sufficient reason for the 
                                                 
157  Opperman (CHC) para 19. 
158  FNB para 100, also quoted in Opperman (CHC) para 19. Regarding the arbitrariness test, see 
further Van der Walt Constitutional Property 245-248. 
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deprivation than in the case when the property is something different and 
the property right something less extensive. This judgment is not concerned 
at all with incorporeal property.  
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the 
incidents of ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more 
compelling than when the deprivation embraces only some incidents of 
ownership and those incidents only partially.  
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature 
of the property in question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be 
circumstances when sufficient reason is established by, in effect, no more 
than a mere rational relationship between means and ends; in others this 
might only be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that 
required by s 36(1) of the Constitution.  
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to 
be decided on all the relevant facts of each particular case, always bearing 
in mind that the enquiry is concerned with "arbitrary" in relation to the 
deprivation of property under s 25. 
 
In summary, to determine whether or not a particular provision – as "law of general 
application" – permits an arbitrary deprivation of property, one needs to consider the 
relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved by 
such a deprivation. The test not only requires a valid public purpose for the 
deprivation, but it also requires that there should be a sufficient nexus between such 
a purpose and the person whose property is affected. The nature of the property 
and the extent of the deprivation must also be considered. 
 
Furthermore, the interplay between the person, the nature of the property, the 
extent of the deprivation and the purpose of the deprivation will determine whether 
the scrutiny is one of mere rationality or one closer to a full proportionality test. In 
other words, depending on all the factors, it may sometimes be enough to show that 
there is a rational link between the purpose of the deprivation and the impact 
thereof.159 However, at other times it might be necessary to determine if the effect 
                                                 
159  FNB para 65. 
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of the deprivation is proportionate to its stated purpose. The former test can be 
referred to as a "thin rationality" test and the latter as a "thick proportionality" test, 
these two being situated on the extreme ends of a continuum.160 The case would 
then lie somewhere on the continuum, depending on the various relationships. 
 
3.3.2 Opperman (CHC) 
 
The way Binns-Ward J applied the non-arbitrariness test is interesting because he 
distinguished between two aspects of the test, albeit without expressly saying so. 
The court first analysed the general justification of the NCA's purposes to curb 
unscrupulous and unlawful credit activities. It is unproblematic for the Act to have 
measures in place to discourage certain unwanted behaviour and to regulate the 
credit market more strictly – even if these measures result in deprivation of 
property. 
 
However, despite the general legitimacy and validity of the NCA initiatives, a closer 
individualised non-arbitrariness test must be conducted to investigate how the 
individual creditor will be affected by the Act's measures. Therefore, it may be that 
the Act's initiatives are generally valid but that they are overbroad insofar as they 
arbitrarily deprive certain individual creditors of their proprietary claims. For 
example, there might be no sufficient relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the effects thereof on that specific creditor, which was exactly the 
case in Opperman. 
 
Consequently, the way that Binns-Ward J approached the investigation indicates a 
logic in terms of which one would start off with a basic rationality enquiry, namely 
asking if there is a legitimate purpose for the deprivation envisioned by the 
provision. As the court stated, the apparent object of the provision is to discourage 
credit granting that falls outside the regulatory framework of the NCA.161 The court 
also rightly confirmed that there is "no quibble about the legitimacy of the state's 
                                                 
160  Van der Walt Constitutional Property 246. 
161  Opperman (CHC) para 20. 
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objectives in seeking to regulate the provision of credit".162 Moreover, there can be 
no argument against the requirement to have persons who are in the business of 
providing credit to register with the NCR.163 Both the director-general of the 
Department of Trade and Industry164 and the acting CEO of the NCR lodged 
affidavits to defend the need for this registration requirement.165 
 
The NCA was enacted to address the shortcomings caused by the outdated nature 
and ineffectiveness of the Usury Act166 and the Credit Agreements Act.167 According 
to the director-general's affidavit, the previous framework distorted the credit market 
by way of "differential and unequal treatment of different credit products and credit 
providers".168 The result was also that consumer protection was afforded at different 
levels, "with the poorest and most vulnerable having the least protection".169 
Because the previous statutes were not properly enforced, the practices of 
unscrupulous credit providers became the norm, which had the effect that certain 
segments of the credit market were stigmatised. The result was that "reputable 
credit providers" (mostly banks) were discouraged from granting credit to the low-
income market and from granting affordable loans to low-income earners. Over-
indebtedness, reckless credit, as well as the high cost of credit and the lack of 
access to credit in some areas contributed to the need to re-evaluate the whole 
credit system.170 
 
Therefore, as the court summarised, the intended effect of the NCA – as confirmed 
by its long title and its provisions as a whole – is171 
 
(i) to introduce controls in the credit industry directed at addressing the exploitation 
of poor persons – primarily micro lenders (ii) promoting the non-discriminatory 
                                                 
162  Opperman (CHC) para 20. 
163  Opperman (CHC) para 20. 
164  Hereafter "the DTI". 
165  Opperman (CHC) para 20. 
166  Usury Act 73 of 1968. 
167  Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. The NCA repealed both of these Acts. 
168  Opperman (CHC) para 21. 
169  Opperman (CHC) para 21. 
170  Opperman (CHC) para 21. 
171  Opperman (CHC) para 22 (footnote omitted). 
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availability of credit, thereby breaking down the rich-poor divide in access to credit 
– a divide that manifested in large measure along racial lines; (iii) providing for the 
improved collection of credit-related data, and, in close connection with this object, 
creating a framework for the registration of credit bureaux, credit providers and 
debt counselling services; (iv) discouraging the reckless extension of credit; and (v) 
putting in place mechanisms to facilitate the redemption of credit-agreement 
related indebtedness and the adjudication of disputes or complaints concerning 
credit agreement transaction. 
 
The court acknowledged the obvious legitimacy of these objectives but emphasised 
that the current case necessitated a focus on specific aspects of the NCA and an 
examination of whether or not there was sufficient reason for the particular 
deprivation contemplated by section 89(5)(c) of the Act.172 Hence, the next step in 
the court's logic (after accepting the general validity of the public purpose of the 
NCA) was to do a deeper scrutiny of the specific deprivation and to investigate the 
detailed nexus between the deprivation and its purpose. 
 
The court verified that the registration of credit providers clearly fulfils an important 
part in assisting the NCR to discharge its functions, which include the maintaining of 
a register of credit providers, gathering information to monitor and supervise the 
credit industry, reviewing legislation, and submitting reports to the DTI to assist in 
ongoing improvements of the Act.173 However, Binns-Ward J was sceptical as to 
whether information regarding the extension of credit by an individual on an ad hoc 
basis who is not doing so in the course of business would "contribute meaningfully" 
to the functions of the NCR.174 In fact, the kind of information that registered credit 
providers would have to furnish to the NCR is the type of data that would be 
meaningful only with regard to persons who are in the business of providing credit 
and not with respect to those who provide credit "only on an isolated occasion".175 
Therefore, the court implied that there was no true nexus between having someone 
like the applicant register and the stated purpose for such registration. In my view, 
                                                 
172  Opperman (CHC) para 22. 
173  Opperman (CHC) para 22-23. 
174  Opperman (CHC) para 24. 
175  Opperman (CHC) para 24. 
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this problem is highlighted by the fact that the result is a deprivation of property, 
without which there would have been no constitutional property challenge. 
 
The court noted that there are various indications in the Act itself that the legislature 
conceived of requiring registration only for persons who, either alone or in 
association with others, are engaged in "the business of providing credit".176 These 
include section 40(2)(c), which contains the words "conducts business". It was not 
clear from the Act why a person like the applicant (who wanted to provide credit in 
excess of R500 000 on an ad hoc basis to a personal friend) would have to register 
and hence provide information to the NCR so that it can consider matters such as 
credit extended for black economic empowerment purposes or in relation to the 
combat against over-indebtedness.177 The Memorandum on the Objects of the 
National Credit Bill, 2005 suggested that it was the initial intention of the Act not to 
apply to or regulate "loans between family members, partners and friends on an 
informal basis".178 Yet the Act itself does not exclude credit agreements between 
friends. 
 
The court commented that the purpose of its analysis of the apparent scope, 
purpose and objects of the Act was to illustrate its impression that the consequence 
of non-registration for a person like the applicant (namely, voidness and forfeiture) 
was "entirely incidental" and did not serve any of the NCA's core purposes.179 
 
The DTI's memorandum provided the following justification for section 89(5)(c):180 
 
The DTI believes that the remedy serves to balance the relative inequality of 
control in the design of such contracts between consumers and credit providers, 
and will ensure that credit providers will have a real incentive to avoid unlawful 
credit agreements. 
                                                 
176  Opperman (CHC) para 26. 
177  Opperman (CHC) para 28. 
178  Opperman (CHC) para 28. 
179  Opperman (CHC) para 29. 
180  Clause 2.9 of the Memorandum on the Objects of the National Credit Bill, 2005, quoted at 
Opperman (CHC) para 30. 
 R BRITS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
452 / 487 
Strangely enough, the effects of section 89(5) were referred to as a "remedy" and 
the director-general's affidavit contended that this "remedy" will be restricted in its 
reach, since to obtain it181 
 
the consumer must go to Court to protect their (sic) rights. In order to do so, 
consumers: (a) will have to know that credit providers are acting unlawfully; and 
(b) will have to be able to access legal representation. 
 
In response, the court expressed "how misconceived the [DTI's] understanding of 
the effect of the provision" was.182 In the first place, the provision arose mero motu 
and not even in the context of debt enforcement proceedings or as a defence raised 
by the consumer.183 Secondly, to state that the provision will be "not widely availed 
of" due to its alleged (and misconceived) narrow operation, "is hardly a cogent 
reason in defence of the impugned provision".184 In fact, this argument contradicted 
one of the most important purposes of the Act, namely to protect vulnerable 
consumers.185 
 
The court further pointed out that there were other unaddressed aspects of section 
89(5). For example, the Act neither indicates the context in which courts should 
make these orders; nor does it provide a mechanism whereby any forfeiture would 
be made known to the state.186 The Act does not explain how the intention to 
prevent unjust enrichment is to be achieved either.187 With reference to an anomaly 
when comparing the process followed before courts and the National Consumer 
Tribunal, the court noted that the third and fourth respondents did not make 
suggestions as to why the188 
 
                                                 
181  Para 66.8 of the director-general's affidavit, quoted at Opperman (CHC) para 30. 
182  Opperman (CHC) para 31. 
183  Opperman (CHC) para 31. 
184  Opperman (CHC) para 31. 
185  Opperman (CHC) para 31. 
186  Opperman (CHC) para 32. 
187  Opperman (CHC) para 32. 
188  Opperman (CHC) para 33. 
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system of administrative fines available in proceedings before the Tribunal could 
not, with suitable adaptation, by itself and without derogation from basic rights, 
afford a suitable incentive to compliance in the context of equivalent matters 
brought before the courts. 
 
This sort of reasoning is typical of proportionality-type assessments. In other words, 
the court noticed that there might be another way to achieve the purposes of 
section 89(5)(c), without infringing the applicant's property rights under section 
25(1). 
 
In defence of section 89(5)(c)(ii), the director-general's affidavit included more 
considerations that "informed the adoption" of the provision.189 The crux of the 
argument was that under the previous dispensation many micro-lenders refused to 
register and therefore continued to trade unlawfully and in an uncontrolled 
environment. The assumption was that these lenders would similarly fail to register 
in terms of the NCA, especially since the new dispensation is stricter. Consequently, 
these lenders will persist in doing business unlawfully, at the expense of the 
registered sector and ultimately to the prejudice of consumers. It would defeat the 
purposes of the Act to allow unregistered credit providers to continue trading and 
making invalid contracts. It would further deprive consumers of the Act's protection 
against unregistered credit providers. Therefore, the provision is aimed at protecting 
the public against such credit providers who fail to comply with the NCA and hence 
place vulnerable people at risk. Because a transgression of the registration 
requirement does not amount to an offence, the director-general argued further that 
section 89(5)(c) was a reasonable and effective way of enforcing the registration 
requirement. 
 
Despite the director-general's arguments, Binns-Ward J found that these 
considerations190 
 
                                                 
189  Para 66.1 to 66.5 of the director-general's affidavit, quoted at Opperman (CHC) para 35. 
190  Opperman (CHC) para 36. 
 R BRITS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
454 / 487 
do not, either singly or collectively, provide sufficient reason for the forfeiture 
provision in s 89(5)(c) of the NCA. The facts of the current case demonstrate that 
an ad hoc lender of money, who is not in the business of providing credit, has been 
caught within the ambit of the provision the apparent objects of which do not bear 
on the type of transaction in which he engaged. 
 
The applicant's actions did not place the public at risk. Moreover, he was neither a 
micro-lender, nor was the transaction remotely similar to the kind of transactions 
that the stricter regulation (and registration requirement) was aimed at.191 Ironically, 
the provision did not impact on a person who was involved in 99 outstanding micro 
loans of R5 000 each – someone who was actually in the business of micro 
lending.192 The reason for this is that such a person would, in terms of the Act, not 
be required to register, since he was involved in less than 100 credit agreements 
and the total outstanding debt was below R500 000. In my view, this illogical 
outcome contributes to the prospect that there was no rational reason for the NCA 
to deprive the applicant of his claim to restitution. It aimed to punish the applicant 
(who was clearly not operating in contradiction to the spirit of the NCA) whereas 
others who may be operating unscrupulously would be able to get away with their 
actions because they are not required to register. 
 
The court moreover noticed that this case did not illustrate any imbalance of power 
or vulnerability on the side of the borrower.193 The court also rejected the argument 
that the deprivation in terms of section 89(5)(c) was necessary due to the absence 
of criminal sanctions for non-registration.194 The omission of a criminal sanction 
(when it is required) is a result of poor drafting and does not of itself justify another 
sanction, like forfeiture. Moreover, it is not correct that non-registration is not 
criminalised.195 Section 54 of the Act authorises the NCR to issue a notice to any 
unregistered person (who is required to be registered) to stop what it is doing. The 
                                                 
191  Opperman (CHC) para 36. 
192  Opperman (CHC) para 36. 
193  Opperman (CHC) para 36. 
194  Opperman (CHC) para 37. 
195  Opperman (CHC) para 37. 
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failure to comply with this notice then qualifies as an offence.196 In addition, 
according to sections 89(2)(e), read with 89(5)(a), any agreement concluded in 
breach of such a notice would also be void and subject to section 89(5)(c). 
 
Therefore, the court stated the essence of its conclusions as follows:197 
 
As the facts of the current case show, the means chosen to incentivise compliance 
leads to a consequence arbitrarily determined irrespective of the presence of any 
wilfulness or negligence on the part of the unregistered credit provider, or its 
degree, and notwithstanding that its failure to have registered in the particular 
circumstances might hold little or no threat to the public in the context of the evils 
or mischiefs at which the statute is expressly directed. 
 
The result of the court's analysis was that the concept of forfeiture in terms of 
section 89(5)(c)(ii) "was not properly thought through".198 Therefore, in the light of 
the FNB test, the court held that sufficient reason for the forfeiture provision was not 
established.199 The substantive effect of the provision was an arbitrary deprivation of 
property. The court also held that it was procedurally arbitrary, since it did not allow 
for any consideration of evidence or submissions by the credit provider who desires 
to mitigate the effect of the provision.200 
 
3.3.3 Opperman (CC) 
 
In the CC the minister argued that the deprivation effected by section 89(5)(c) was 
not arbitrary because the requirement of procedural fairness is satisfied. The reason 
for this contention was that a court must make an order before the forfeiture takes 
place. The problem with this argument, the CC held, was that the provision did not 
provide the court with a discretion based on justice and equity.201 In this regard, the 
                                                 
196  Opperman (CHC) para 37. Otto 2010 TSAR 168 makes the same point. 
197  Opperman (CHC) para 37. 
198  Opperman (CHC) para 38. 
199  Opperman (CHC) para 38. 
200  Opperman (CHC) para 38. 
201  Opperman (CC) para 69.  
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CC referred to its previous judgment in Mohunram v NDPP,202 where it held that it 
would amount to arbitrary deprivation of property if the court that orders the 
forfeiture had no discretion.203 The Opperman case therefore confirms that a 
deprivation of property effected in terms of legislation will be arbitrary if the court is 
compelled to grant the order without being allowed to exercise a discretion that 
takes the justice of the case into consideration.204 
 
Because the deprivation effected by the section 89(5)(c) forfeiture was not partial 
and it "effectively removes an unregistered credit provider's right to restitution", the 
court held there had to be persuasive reasons.205 The minister argued that the 
purpose of the deprivation was important, since it was aimed at protecting the public 
against unscrupulous creditors. Moreover, the provision was punitive in nature so as 
to deter unregistered creditors from operating outside the regulatory framework of 
the Act when they grant loans.206 Although the CC respected these objectives, it was 
not convinced that the importance of the purpose provided sufficient reason for the 
deprivation.207  
 
The Court commented that "[w]hereas regulated deprivation may be permissible to 
further compelling interests, the state still has to be constrained in how it may 
pursue those ends".208 Since the scope of the deprivation was so far-reaching in this 
case, the purpose had to be stated clearly and the means chosen to accomplish it 
had to be narrowly framed.209 Concerning section 89(5)(c), the Court therefore 
found that the means chosen were disproportionate to the purpose.210 In other 
words, the provision resulted in arbitrary deprivation in contravention of section 
                                                 
202  Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecution (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 
4 SA 222 (CC) para 121. 
203  Opperman (CC) para 69.  
204  This position is reminiscent of Van der Walt's conclusion that a deprivation that takes place in 
terms of legislation will be procedurally fair only if the act provides for judicial oversight: See Van 
der Walt 2012 Stell LR 94. Judicial oversight necessarily implies a discretion, without which it will 
be judicial oversight in name only. 
205  Opperman (CC) para 70, citing S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388 (CC) para 18 
(hereafter "S v Bhulwana"). 
206  Opperman (CC) para 70. 
207  Opperman (CC) para 71. 
208  Opperman (CC) para 71. 
209  Opperman (CC) para 71. 
210  Opperman (CC) para 71. 
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25(1) of the Constitution.211 The CC in essence endorsed the Cape High Court's 
analyses. 
 
3.4 Justification under section 36 
 
3.4.1 Opperman (CHC) 
 
In terms of the FNB test, if one finds that a certain provision permits an arbitrary 
deprivation of property and accordingly violates section 25(1), the next step is to 
determine if such a limitation of the section 25(1) right can be saved in terms of 
section 36(1) of the Constitution. Before the Cape High Court, the third and fourth 
respondents argued that this indeed would be possible in this case.212 
 
Section 36 – the limitation clause – provides as follows:213 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including - 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
The court noted that it would be realistic to acknowledge that an argument based on 
section 36(1) would not be an easy one to make:214 
 
                                                 
211  Opperman (CC) para 72. 
212  Opperman (CHC) para 39. 
213  On the limitation clause in general, see Woolman and Botha "Limitations"; Currie and De Waal 
Bill of Rights 163-188. 
214  Opperman (CHC) para 39. 
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Arbitrariness is essentially antithetical to the core values of the Constitution which 
espouse rationality, reasonableness and justifiability – without which accountability, 
responsiveness and openness go wanting, as indeed does a credible foundation for 
the rule of law. 
 
Moreover, the court pointed out that the considerations for the section 25(1) 
sufficient-reason test correspond notably to the considerations one must take into 
account under the section 36 justification test.215 Therefore, many of the aspects it 
would take into account when doing a section 36(1) enquiry had already been taken 
into account when it did the section 25(1) assessment.216  
 
The court nevertheless briefly considered if there might be further considerations 
that could justify the arbitrary deprivation of property. However, counsel could not 
provide the court with any equivalent provision in foreign law, not even from those 
jurisdictions that the government ostensibly investigated when it drafted the NCA.217 
Furthermore, there is no indication that the government took account of the 
common law principles laid down in Jajbhay v Cassim, and there was no reason why 
the normal common law consequences of void contracts could not be a sufficient 
incentive for credit providers to register.218 A creditor who concluded an unlawful 
credit agreement would after all not be able to levy any interests, charges or fees, 
which is its sole purpose for concluding the agreement. The court could not 
contemplate why, in addition to losing its claim for profit, the credit provider would 
also have to forfeit its capital.219 In further criticism of section 89(5)(c) the court 
held as follows:220 
 
The difference between the ordinary consequences of voidness and those following 
on the operation of the attendant forfeiture provision points to the divide between a 
legitimately devised encouragement to statutory compliance (which is 
unexceptionable) and the creation, under a civil guise, of a substantively and 
                                                 
215  Opperman (CHC) para 39. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property 285. 
216  Opperman (CHC) para 40. 
217  Opperman (CHC) para 40. 
218  Opperman (CHC) para 40. 
219  Opperman (CHC) para 40. 
220  Opperman (CHC) para 40. 
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procedurally unjust penal system for non-compliance (which does not bear 
constitutional scrutiny). 
 
Accordingly, at least in many cases, the means used to achieve the statutory end 
(namely, the arbitrary deprivation of property) is "unreasonably and unjustifiably 
disproportionate" in its effects. For this reason the violation of section 25(1) could 
also not satisfy section 36(1).221 
 
3.4.2 Opperman (CC) 
 
Before the CC, the minister once again argued, in the alternative, that section 
89(5)(c) involved a constitutionally permissible limitation of the creditor's section 
25(1) right.222 The CC noted the immediate question: "can the deprivation of 
property which is indeed arbitrary, ever be a reasonable and justifiable limitation in 
an open and democratic society, in terms of section 36(1)?"223 As Roux had pointed 
out, there are obvious conceptual difficulties in acknowledging a positive answer to 
this question.224 The CC quoted from Ackermann J's judgment in S v 
Makwanyane:225 
 
Neither arbitrary action nor laws or rules which are inherently arbitrary or must lead 
to arbitrary application can, in any real sense, be tested against the precepts or 
principles of the Constitution. 
 
Even the minister agreed that a section 36(1) argument would be a difficult one to 
make if arbitrary deprivation had been proven.226 However, FNB had earlier 
assumed, without deciding, that an arbitrary deprivation must be tested under 
                                                 
221  Opperman (CHC) para 40. 
222  Opperman (CC) para 73. 
223  Opperman (CC) para 73. 
224  Opperman (CC) para 73, with reference to Roux "Property" 46-26. See further Van der Walt 
2012 JQR para 2.1.1; Van der Walt Constitutional Property 76-77. 
225  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 156, quoted by Van der Westhuizen J in Opperman 
(CC) para 73. 
226  Opperman (CC) para 73. 
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section 36.227 Moreover, as FNB also remarked, the wording of section 36 does not 
appear to exclude the limitation of any right from its provisions.228 In fact, section 
25(8) expressly states that any departure from section 25 must be "in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36(1)".229 
 
Like the Cape High Court, the CC in Opperman observed that many of the factors 
that would be used under the arbitrariness test would lead to the same conclusion 
when doing the section 36 test.230 As section 36(1)(d) requires, the relationship 
between the limitation and its purpose must be investigated. The CC confirmed that 
disproportionate means may not be used to achieve purposes that impact on 
constitutional rights.231 Also, section 36(1)(e) requires that the availability of less 
restrictive means must be considered. In this respect the CC held that the common 
law position is less restrictive than section 89(5)(c). In the first place, turpitude is 
taken into consideration when restitution is claimed based on performance rendered 
in terms of an unlawful contract. Secondly, the common law does discourage the 
granting of loans by unregistered credit providers. In addition, as section 89(5)(b) 
requires, the creditor must refund all money paid by the debtor, with interest. 
 
Therefore, the lack of "a discretion to distinguish between credit providers who 
intentionally exploit consumers and those who fail to register because of ignorance 
and lend money to a friend on an ad hoc basis" is disproportional.232 The debtor can 
furthermore complain to the NCR, who can bring the complaint to the National 
Consumer Tribunal, who can declare the creditor's conduct as prohibited.233 The 
Tribunal can also impose certain administrative fines.234 This measure assists in 
achieving the NCA's stated purposes.235 Another mechanism to achieve the NCA's 
purpose is the fact that the creditor is not legally entitled to interest in terms of the 
                                                 
227  Opperman (CC) para 74, with reference to FNB para 110. 
228  Opperman (CC) para 74, with reference to FNB para 110. 
229  Opperman (CC) para 74. 
230  Opperman (CC) para 75. 
231  Opperman (CC) para 76, citing S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 
SA 1 (CC) para 34. 
232  Opperman (CC) para 76. 
233  Opperman (CC) para 77, with reference to s 136 NCA. 
234  Opperman (CC) para 77, with reference to s 151(3) NCA. 
235  Opperman (CC) para 77. 
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unlawful agreement. Hence, foregoing the interest is another way to achieve the 
goals of the NCA in a way that is less restrictive than the route chosen by section 
89(5)(c).236 
 
In effect, all the factors mentioned in section 36(1) were already taken into account 
when doing the arbitrariness test.237 Hence, the Court was "not persuaded that 
section 89(5)(c) [could] be saved as a reasonable and justifiable limitation" of the 
right contained in section 25(1). 
 
3.5 Remedy 
 
3.5.1 Opperman (CHC) 
 
The Cape High Court re-emphasised that the forfeiture provision was not properly 
thought through and that it does not serve its purpose in an effective or coherent 
manner. There seemed to be no clarity with regard to why the provision was 
necessary or why the ordinary common law consequences of void agreements could 
not sufficiently achieve the legislature's intention. Therefore, regarding the possibility 
of reading words into the provision to remedy its unconstitutionality, the court held 
that "judicial re-crafting" of the provision would not amount to a just and equitable 
remedy.238 
 
It had not been shown that section 89(5)(c) plays a necessary or important role in 
achieving the aims of the Act.239 Moreover, the court was of the opinion that the 
common law consequences of void agreements are in themselves enough incentive 
to comply with the registration requirement. In addition, the invalidity of section 
89(5)(c) will leave unaffected the criminal and administrative sanctions that can be 
imposed upon unregistered credit providers. Therefore, no one could be expected 
                                                 
236  Opperman (CC) para 78. 
237  Opperman (CC) para 79. 
238  Opperman (CHC) para 43. 
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"to tolerate the infringement of basic rights" and therefore a suspension of the order 
of invalidity would also be inappropriate. 
 
Since an order of invalidity would have no force until the CC confirms it, the court 
postponed the sequestration application and extended the rule nisi for six months so 
as to await the outcome of the CC proceedings.240 
 
3.5.2 Opperman (CC) 
 
Before the CC the NCR argued that the constitutional difficulty of the provision could 
be remedied by reading in an appropriate discretion.241 The discretion would allow a 
court to take account of the objectives of the NCA.242 However, the CC held that it 
would be preferable for Parliament to address the content of the provision 
comprehensively, "rather than for a court to venture into patch-work legislating".243 
Hence, the Court decided to declare the provision invalid without any reading in.244 
 
The minister requested the court to suspend the order of invalidity for two years to 
grant Parliament some time to amend the NCA. However, the CC agreed with the 
high court that "no significant gap would be created by an order which does not 
provide for a period of suspension".245 The common law will simply apply until the 
legislature replaces section 89(5)(c), which will result in just outcomes, since the 
degree of blameworthiness of the unregistered creditor will be taken into account.246 
Concerning retrospectivity, the CC held that the order of invalidity will have no effect 
on cases that already have been finalised.247 
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3.6 A brief comment on the remainder of section 89(5) 
 
As Otto explains, the CC did not resolve all the problems regarding section 89(5), 
since it dealt with the constitutionality of paragraph (c) only, whereas paragraph (b) 
is still in place.248 This provision mandates a court to order that "the credit provider 
must refund to the consumer any money paid by the consumer under that [unlawful 
credit] agreement to the credit provider, with interest ... "249 Because this paragraph 
does not account for the rights of creditors, Otto believes that, similar to section 
89(5)(c), it will be declared unconstitutional eventually.250 The author sees in this 
provision the startling possibility that the debtor would be able to reclaim all the 
amounts of the loan that he has repaid to the creditor, notwithstanding that this is 
the money that the creditor originally lent to the debtor.251 
 
With paragraph (c) having been declared invalid and hence removed from section 
89(5), paragraph (b) makes little sense. The CC also acknowledged the potential 
problem with paragraph (b) and remarked that section 89(5) as a whole needs to be 
reformulated by Parliament, since leaving paragraph (b) in place may create tension 
between the debtor's claim for a refund and the creditor's enrichment claim.252 The 
only way that paragraph (b) could have made sense is if paragraph (c) was 
constitutionally acceptable, but without paragraph (c) it would be artificial to try to 
establish meaning for the remainder of section 89(5). Instead, as Otto contends, the 
legislature ought to reconsider the subsection as a whole.253  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The Opperman decisions show that the common law regulation of unlawful 
agreements (the par delictum rule and its exceptions) is more sophisticated and, 
since it leaves the court with a discretion, is more in line with the Constitution than 
                                                 
248  Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
249  Section 89(5)(b) NCA. 
250  Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
251  Otto 2013 TSAR 234. 
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Parliament's attempt to address the issue in the NCA. The common law allows 
parties to forfeit performances rendered under invalid agreements only if there is a 
degree or bad faith or turpitude present. On the other hand, the NCA obliges courts 
to order such a forfeiture without any regard to the parties' blameworthiness. 
 
The common law also does not result in the state's obtaining the right to claim 
restitution of performances rendered, whereas the NCA does have this effect. The 
NCA's apparent aim is to avoid unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor but 
nevertheless to punish the creditor for having granted credit without being 
registered. This punishment, which purports to discourage non-registration, 
however, does not take the form of a criminal fine (of which there are examples in 
the Act), but simply requires a forfeiture to the state of the "guilty" creditor's right of 
restitution. 
 
As the scrutiny by the Cape High Court and the CC illustrates, the NCA's measures to 
address the consequences of unlawful agreements are incoherent, unclear, 
overbroad and constitutionally unacceptable. Hopefully Parliament will come up with 
something more sophisticated and more narrowly defined so as to address the 
problem of credit agreements entered into by unregistered credit providers.  
 
Furthermore, Parliament should rethink the class of credit providers that ought to be 
registered, since it is clear that certain creditors who might actually commit the 
types of wrongs that the Act wishes to avoid do not even have to register, whereas 
others who pose a very low risk (like ad hoc lenders) must be registered. Given the 
degree to which it might result in the deprivation of bona fide creditors' property 
rights, this anomaly is patently arbitrary and irrational. 
 
If Parliament is of the view that the normal consequences of unlawful credit 
agreements (like the par delictum rule) do not adequately discourage non-
registration, this fact should be addressed by measures that are in line with the 
Constitution. That is, they must be fair, rational and narrowly defined so as to not 
unjustifiably prejudice those creditors who are not guilty of the undesired behaviour 
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that the registration requirement aims to address. When it amends the Act, the 
legislature ought to study the rules that have developed surrounding the application 
of the par delictum rule even if it wishes not to follow the exact same approach. 
 
It is necessary to point out that the recently published Draft National Credit 
Amendment Bill254 acknowledges that section 89(5)(c)(ii) must be removed, yet no 
attempt is made to amend section 89(5) as a whole, despite the calls for its 
reconsideration.  It appears that Parliament accepts that the common law as it 
stands should regulate the matter instead. Unfortunately, the legislature also does 
not propose the removal of paragraph (b). One can only hope that the eventual 
amendment will address the issue more comprehensively. 
 
On a more general level, the decision will have broader consequences in the law 
regarding credit agreements, since it is clear how useful constitutional property law 
can be when analysing the effects of legislation like the NCA. Opperman dealt with 
the right to claim restitution of performance rendered in terms of an unlawful 
agreement. This claim – based on unjust enrichment – is a personal right sounding 
in money, which can now conclusively be regarded as "property" for constitutional 
purposes. More generally, the case also opens the door to assume that other money 
claims like personal rights created by contract and delict will also qualify as 
"property" for constitutional purposes. 
 
Therefore, when the NCA (or any other law of general application) regulates 
creditors' rights to claim performance of personal rights created under credit 
agreements (or any other agreement), these regulations might amount to 
deprivation of property for section 25 purposes. The result would be that these 
interferences with creditors' rights must be measured against the non-arbitrariness 
standard as set out in FNB and illustrated in the Opperman judgments. Recognising 
the role of section 25 in the current context is a positive development and calls for 
                                                 
254  Draft National Credit Amendment Bill, 2013. See GN 560 in GG 36505 of 29 May 2013. See also 
para 2.1.3.4.7 of the Draft National Credit Act Policy Review Framework, 2013 (GN 559 in GG 
36504 of 29 May 2013). 
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lawmakers to draft legislation in such a way that regulatory mechanisms are 
sophisticated, rational and sufficiently proportionate to their goals. 
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